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This is a type of threat that has a long history in electoral politics, and can take many 
forms.1  The basic approach is that a perpetrator attacks precinct voting, regardless of 
voting system, on election day in an effort to disrupt the process sufficiently to produce 
an effective “denial of service” attack.  The perpetrator, based on an analysis of past 
elections returns, would target selected precincts that are highly likely to cast votes in a 
certain direction.  For example, if the perpetrator wished to sway the election for party X, 
he or she would target precincts that have very heavy concentrations of party Y 
supporters.  In a close election, especially in lower-level races, such an attack could either 
sway the outcome of an election to party X or could throw considerable doubt and 
distrust into the announced election outcome. 
 
Such an attack could be mounted in a wide variety of ways.  The perpetrator could 
attempt to mount some sort of disturbance at certain critical times on election day in 
selected precincts.  For example, in a high-turnout election where there are long lines of 
citizens waiting to vote just before polls close, the perpetrator could stage a protest at the 
entrance of the poll site; while such a demonstration is likely to be illegal if sufficiently 
close to the polling place, again if it either led some number of citizens to turn away and 
                                                
1 Bensel writes about political clubs in Baltimore during the 1850’s, and he described one example of this 
threat:  “The usual tactics used by these clubs on election day entailed the occupation of the area in front of 
the voting window by dozens of their members.  Would-be voters were then forced to make their way 
through the crowd in order to hand their tickets to the election judges.  As they moved through the crowd, 
club members would insist on seeing the ticket they wished to vote.  If it was the American ticket, the 
crowd would part ranks, making an open path to the window.  If it was the Democratic or “reform” ticket (a 
euphemism for the Democratic ticket), a cry would go out, alerting other club members that a member of 
the opposition was attempting to vote … This was the signal prompting a general movement of the 
members in mass, outward to the street.  The would-be voter was thus physically moved away from the 
window by the sheer bulk of the crowd”  (Richard Franklin Bensel, The American Ballot Box in the Mid-
Nineteenth Century, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pages 171-172). 
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not vote, or led to the perception that some number of citizens were not allowed to vote, 
many might question the integrity of the election.2   Or, the perpetrator could coordinate 
sending confederates to certain polling places to intimidate potential voters, similar to the 
historical example cited above.3 
 
Other ways such an attack could be mounted might be more difficult to monitor and 
prevent.  For example, the perpetrator could threaten the operation of the polling place by 
sending operatives to somehow disable or cripple the voting devices (or a sufficiently 
large subset of the voting devices to generate confusion and long lines) early on election 
day, thus leading to long lines and potential disenfranchisement of voters later in the day.  
Or they could disable or cripple the voting devices near the close of voting on election 
day, producing long lines and potentially disenfranchising voters who might be told they 
were not allowed to vote after the close of the polls (or who grew frustrated and leave).  
The method of such an attack would depend on the voting system in place, and the 
perpetrator’s ability to coordinate a number of confederates to assist in the attack. 
 
Such attacks could be mounted as insider attacks.  For example, in 2002 the U.S. 
Department of Justice resolved voting rights complaints in two Florida counties; the 
complaints alleged that one county “had not translated all of its election documents and 
information into Spanish, failed to assign a sufficient number of bilingual poll officials to 
polling sites with significant numbers of Spanish-speaking voters, and denied some voters 
assistance from persons of their own choosing.”4  If the perpetrator were able to recruit 
conspirators to assist in such denial-of-service attacks in such ways, such attacks could be 
mounted and could be difficult to prevent on election day, or even in the immediate 
aftermath of the election.  They could result in considerable voter disenfranchisement, 
and could again cast doubt on the integrity of the election outcome. 
 
Of course, such an attack could be mounted in a much more coordinated way, by a highly 
motivated and well-resourced perpetrator.  For example, a highly-motivated and well-
resourced perpetrator could attack infrastructure on election day, in a number of ways 
that either could directly disrupt the voting process or which could indirectly serve to 
distract or disenfranchise voters in certain areas of a jurisdiction.  A perpetrator in such a 
scenario could disrupt utility service to some targeted part of an election jurisdiction 
(again the perpetrator could attack utility service in a part of the jurisdiction that has a 
high concentration of party Y supporters, thereby distracting or disenfranchising such 
                                                
2 While laws exist to help prevent direct voter intimidation or electioneering close to the entrance to polling 
places, one could imagine that a sufficiently large public demonstration near a polling place could serve as 
a distraction or effectively block access to the polling place, disrupting service for otherwise eligible voters 
at that polling place, for example, by blocking access to parking lots or by making access difficult from 
local surface streets.   
3 For modern allegations of voter intimidation tactics, see the report from the People For The American 
Way Foundation, “The Long Shadow of Jim Crow”, http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/dfiles/file_462.pdf (last 
touched October 5, 2005). 
4 See http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/February/02_crt_380.htm for details of the allegations and the 
consent decree.  
 3 
voters if the attack prevents or distracts them from voting), or across a series of election 
jurisdictions.5 
 
Also, perpetrators could mount highly effective denial-of-service attacks on election day 
in precinct voting if they could mount successful pre-election attacks (either insider or by 
other means) on election administration systems.  An example here would be a pre-
election attack on a voter registration file (either at the local or state level).  The 
perpetrator, with access to an electronic voter registration file with associated voter 
history data could effectively disenfranchise certain types of voters (say again those 
highly likely to cast ballots for their opponent, determined from either their partisan 
registration or voting history information) by altering their registration status, changing 
registration information, or perhaps altering records like early or absentee voting status in 
the current election.  Eligible voters showing up to vote in the affected precincts would 
find their names not on the voter registration list, or be told they had already voted, either 
directly disenfranchising those voters or causing significant disruptions and long lines.   
 
The resources needed to mount these attacks vary with their planned scope.  In closely 
contested local elections, the perpetrator might need to effectively disrupt polling place 
operations in a single precinct, if their opponent’s supporters are highly concentrated in 
that precinct, to potentially keep even a handful of the opposition’s supporters from 
having the opportunity to vote.  Effective denial of service attacks, mounted in different 
elections (say legislative races) would require more resources, primarily requiring that the 
perpetrator recruit and coordinate the activities of a greater number of confederates.  Or, a 
well-resourced perpetrator could attempt a denial-of-service attack, as noted above, 
without many confederates by targeting infrastructure. 
 
As noted a number of times, these attacks can have two consequences.  One direct 
consequence is the disenfranchisement of a selected set of targeted voters, who have been 
prevented or discouraged from voting.  An indirect consequence is doubts raised about 
the integrity of the election outcome.  There are some mitigation strategies for the direct 
effect, including extending polling hours, allowing impacted voters the right to quickly 
and easily cast provisional ballots in another polling place, or in the case of a broad 
attack, holding another election.6  The most problematic aspect of any denial-of-service 
attack, however, is the threat to the integrity of an election.  Thus, even low-level denial-
of-service attacks, occurring in a hotly contested election, might pose a substantial risk. 
 
 
                                                
5 Some of these scenarios have been explored by John C. Fortier and Norman J. Ornstein, in their Election 
Law Journal, “If Terrorists Attacked Our Presidential Elections” (Volume 3, Number 4, 2004, pages 597-
612.).  See especially the section “The Disruption of Election Day”, pages 601-604. 
6 These mitigation strategies might be ones that some election officials may have planned for, but in the 
context of natural disasters.  However, if some type of denial of service attack were undertaken that 
affected a number of election jurisdictions, it might be difficult to quickly coordinate a response on election 
day that might alleviate potential voter disenfranchisement. 
